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Wolfgang Merkel
The New Dictatorships
Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, which appeared in 1951, still bore
the deep imprint of the recently dismantled National Socialist terror regime and the
most extreme excesses of Stalinism. The distinguishing features of totalitarianism as
a regime type were then readily identifiable: an elaborate ideology of domination plus
terrorism, both of which characterized the »short twentieth century’s« history of
political rule and warfare. Both Hannah Arendt and Harvard University scholar Carl
Joachim Friedrich distinguished carefully between authoritarian and totalitarian
regimes. Authoritarian regimes, Arendt said, curtailed freedom, whereas totalitarian
rule did away with it entirely. In essence, the notion of totalitarianism focused on the
untrammeled control that that those in power wielded over their subjects.Under such
circumstances not even the state should be regarded as the principal locus of power.
According to Arendt that role was played by the party – and of course its leader – that
articulated the official word-view. Both totalitarian systems sought to legitimize their
rule by deploying a grand ideological narrative, whether of the »classless society« in the
case of Stalinism, or »the superiority of our race and nation« in the case of Nazism.
From the very outset, neither the concept nor the theory of totalitarianism was
free of inconsistencies and over-hasty analogies. It was always a problematic move to
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equate (at least implicitly) a Promethean idea of the »realm of freedom« (Karl Marx)
with the darkness of a National Socialist ideology of annihilation. Of course, in practice
these regimes displayed certain parallels – despite the dissimilarities – in respect to
the uses of terror. Both erected Leviathan-like apparatuses that destroyed freedom
and carried out deadly repression against Jews and class enemies, respectively.
During the Cold War the concept of totalitarianism continued to lose analytic
clarity as it was used prematurely to describe all communist regimes and, increasingly,
any dictatorship whatsoever. Not infrequently, it degenerated into a political rallying
cry. In reality, truly totalitarian regimes were not that common in the 20th century.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1956, Nazi Germany from 1934/38 to
1945, some of the Eastern European satellite regimes in the 50s, China from the early
50s up until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia,
and the autocratic Kim family dynasty in North Korea furnish irrefutable examples
of totalitarian rule. In the early years of the 21st century the People’s Republic of North
Korea is the only totalitarian regime left. The theocratic Islamic regimes in Iran and
Saudi Arabia or of the Taliban in Afghanistan never have become fully totalitarian.
Although their fundamentalist dogmas were intended to penetrate deeply into the
everyday lives of the faithful, those governments lacked the mature state development
that would have allowed them to translate their ambitions of complete control  into a
full-blown totalitarian reality.
Dictatorships in the 21st century
The long-lasting third wave of democratization that culminated in the collapse of
the Soviet empire at the end of the 20th century altered the national and international
conditions for political rule. If we disregard the more radicalized versions of Islam
that have been emerging in some places, grand ideological narratives of political rule
have disappeared. Given the globalized economic and communications networks
that have emerged, it is an anachronistic fiction to imagine that autocracies could
hermetically seal off a zone of political control. Political authority increasingly requires
forms of justification that take freedom, political participation, and respect for human
rights into account. New forms of autocratic rule came into being that scholars now
classify under the heading of electoral authoritarianism, i.e., autocracies with elections.
Such elections are quite distinct from those that were held in the Eastern Bloc in
the era of »really existing socialism,« in which voter turnout exceeded 99 % and the
communist candidates and those of their satellite parties typically won about 99 % of
the votes cast. That kind of election is now a quaint relic of the past. Today, elections in
authoritarian regimes in Africa or Asia no longer can be so easily managed as they were
in the former Eastern Bloc. To be sure, they are manipulated, orchestrated, and rigged,
but they also offer the opposition a welcome opportunity to mobilize, make alliances,
and appeal to a national and international public. The new authoritarian desire to
establish a formally democratic residue of legitimacy in the domestic and foreign
arenas carries with it a risk to the legitimacy of those in power.
Formerly clear boundaries between prototypical democracies and dictatorships
have grown increasingly blurred. Leaving aside merely polemical use of terms, who
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would want to say exactly which of the following regimes should be counted as an
autocracy or merely classified as a defective democracy: Russia under Vladimir Putin
(or Boris Yelstin), the Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the contemporary Ukraine,
Venezuela, the Philippines, or Singapore? Scholarly research on regimes has grown
more cautious. Increasingly it avoids clear typologies and locates really existing
regimes along a continuum between the ideal of democracy under the rule of law on the
one hand and »perfect« dictatorship on the other.Such classifications thus leave many
political regimes in a gray area between the ideal-types. Accordingly, researchers in
the field are now talking about »gray area regimes.« These are then subdivided into
hybrid regimes (Russia), »democraduras« (Venezuela), or defective democracies
(Hungary). Furthermore, the gray area regimes are more stable than is commonly
assumed, in that they do not move over time in the direction of becoming closed
dictatorships or open democracies. They have long since established their own equi-
librium, one that is sensitive to both historical and political contexts. Today, Putin,
Erdogan, and Orbán enjoy greater popularity among their respective citizen bodies
– and the non-elites within them – than the chancellor of Germany or the President
of France’s Fifth Republic, although both of the latter govern democratic countries
under the rule of law. This paradox is one aspect of the postmodern jigsaw puzzle: all
across the globe forms of political authority are growing more differentiated.
How stable are the new dictatorships?
If we assume the tripartite division of political regimes into autocracies, hybrid
regimes, and democracies, we can distinguish, among the 200 or so countries in the
world, about 65 democracies under the rule of law and 45 unvarnished autocracies.
Of the remainder, the majority are hybrid regimes in all of their different permutations.
So how stable are political regimes really? How durable are dictatorships? Sta-
tistically speaking, over the past 60 years democracies have been the most stable, fol-
lowed by dictatorships, and finally by hybrid regimes.What is the reason for the relative
stability of dictatorial regimes? In a study recently carried out at the Berlin Social
Science Center we assumed that political rule in dictatorships, as incidentally in hybrid
regimes as well, rests on three pillars: legitimation, repression, and cooptation.
Legitimation always derives from two sources, one normative and the other per-
formance-based.Anti-liberalism, racism, nationalism, religiously anachronistic ideas
of salvation, as well as Marxist visionary schemes all can generate at least temporary
normative approval among those on the receiving end of political rule. However,
in the early years of the 21st century fascist and communist ideologies have lost much
of their appeal. If any ideologies still have the ability to create strong ties among their
adherents nowadays, it would be the variants of Islamic political fundamentalism. But
for them, restrictions on basic human rights are part of the canon of principles upon
which their claims to rule depend.And, for that very reason, in the long run the well-
springs of their promises of salvation will likely dry up and the enchantment of their
world will fade in the cold light of a repressive reality. Because the normative side of
legitimation is sapped in this way, dictatorial regimes rely for support especially on their
performance in the areas of the economy, security, and order. But autocratic regimes
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also face risks if the economy and society modernize too rapidly.When that happens,
middle classes form, workers unionize, educational levels increase, civil society
emerges, and discourses get underway that invite broader political participation.
However, this is not a trend that culminates inevitably in a successful process of
democratization in the way that modernization theory optimistically still claims. That
other outcomes are possible is confirmed by diverse countries such as Singapore, the
People’s Republic of China or the petro-dictatorships of the Gulf. The latter of course
maintain enormous numbers of Southeast Asian slave laborers deprived of all rights,
which enables them to evade the challenge of dealing with a self-confident domestic
working class.
Second, autocracies rely on repression, which can assume different forms and
levels of intensity.We distinguish in our research project (»Why do dictatorships sur-
vive?«) between »soft« and »hard« repression, although their boundaries are shifting.
Whereas the first of these primarily aims to restrict political rights such as the free-
doms of assembly, expression, press, and employment, the latter is designed mainly
to attack the core of human rights, such as the right to life, physical integrity, and the
liberty of the individual. It can be demonstrated empirically that elites in authoritarian
systems of rule frequently react to threats to the status quo with intensified repression.
Yet repression alone is scarcely capable of stabilizing a political regime in the long
run. This is so because a great deal of legitimacy is being sacrificed.When repression
is ratcheted up, its deterrent power is enhanced, but simultaneously there is a loss of
legitimation and thereby of popular consent. High levels of hard repression are ex-
pensive,and ultimately they undermine the foundations of political authority.During
the period that we examined (1950-2008), statistical evidence shows that soft re-
pression was the most successful factor in stabilizing hundreds of dictatorships.
The third pillar of political domination is cooptation. It may enable elites in auto-
cratic systems of rule to induct influential actors and groups outside the regime proper
into the inner circle of the dictatorship. Strategically important elites of this type are
generally recruited from among the economic elite, the security services, and the mili-
tary. They are usually offered offices, political privileges, resources, and economic con-
cessions as a quid pro quo for their loyalty. Corruption, clientelism, and patrimonial
networks are their instruments.
Nevertheless, the availability of resources places limits on the duration and extent
of »purchased« collaboration of broad groups with the regime. In our analysis we
show that weaknesses in one of the pillars of rule can be offset by shoring up the other
ones. Yet in some instances cracks in one pillar can overburden the others. Then
spaces of protest open up that, if employed on a grand scale, can lead to the collapse
of the entire regime. Of course, there are no guarantees that the rule of law and
democracy will ensue from its demise. The many unsuccessful processes of trans-
formation in the eastern portions of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Arab
Spring all confirm this.
It is also possible to overestimate the stabilizing influence of cooptation.As a rule,
the ideal equilibrium state for the survival of dictatorships would combine a high level
of legitimation derived from ideology and performance, the least possible application
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of »hard« repression, extensive »soft« repression, and a moderate degree of cooptation.
Singapore approaches that equilibrium state most closely, while China is clearly headed
in that direction. But even hybrid regimes such as Putin’s Russia are not so far re-
moved from an equilibrium of this sort.
Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that we are witnessing the irreversible triumph of
democracy (1991) proved to be a half-baked fantasy. The envisioned export of demo-
cracy from the West to the rest and of military regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Libya has failed dismally. The free societies of the West, East, and South will have
to continue living and negotiating with dictatorships. There are no panaceas. Trade-
offs have already been programmed in. A magical polygon still has not been devised
that would accommodate values, interests, human rights, economy, democracy, and
stability. There are no short cuts in dealing with dictatorships. It will take tedious
negotiations,value-based pragmatism,and the proverbial long,hard road to get there.
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